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The Risk of Blood-Borne Viral Infection  
due to Syringe Re-Use 
** T. Oraby et al.* 
McLaughlin Centre for Population Health Risk Assessment, University of Ottawa,  
Canada 
1. Introduction 
Transmission of viral and bacterial infections through the practice of syringe re-use has been 
repeatedly documented (American Society of Anesthesiologists, 1999) and controlled 
experiments have demonstrated that a syringe barrel becomes contaminated with microbes 
after multiple re-uses (Lessard et al., 1988; Perceval, 1980).  
In the fall of 2008, light was shed on the practice of syringe re-use occurring in western 
Canada (Government of Alberta, 2009). In this situation, syringes had been re-used between 
patients to administer sedating medication through patient intravenous (IV) lines 
(Government of Alberta, 2009). Later it was reported that other incidents of syringe re-use 
had occurred in Canada (CBC News-Edmonton, 2008a;CBC News-Edmonton, 2008b). The 
question arose of whether this practice may have resulted in the transmission of blood-
borne pathogens to patients and, if so, how many and with what level of risk. To answer this 
question, a retrospective study involving approximately 1,400 patients was undertaken 
(Government of Alberta, 2009). However, questions were also raised as to whether estimates 
based on modeling scenarios could provide information to guide decisions on the need for 
look-backs.  
Risk assessments have been carried out almost concurrently with the underlying study; they 
gave various and different conclusions (Population Health Branch-Saskatchewan Health, 
2009; Sikora et al., 2010). Contrary to our study where we considered the Canadian nation as 
a whole, the Population Health Branch-Saskatchewan study looked at only a province-wide 
risk assessment for Saskatchewan based on the same methods in Sikora et al. (2010); they 
concluded that the blood-borne viral infection was negligible (Population Health Branch-
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Saskatchewan Health, 2009). The model in Sikora et al., (2010) is a multiplicative model of 
four probabilities. It also considers only the risk that one patient is imposing on one other 
patient without taking into account the number of times the syringe may have been re-used 
in between them.  
A novel but simple probabilistic model is established in the underlying study to reflect more 
accurately the practical situation that is occurring. The risk of viral infection at any time of 
re-use depends not only on the prevalence and susceptibility but also the number of times 
the syringe barrel was re-used before that time. Uncertainty and sensitivity analyses were 
carried out here to incorporate the lack of knowledge about different parameters, e.g. 
probability of contaminating a syringe, and assess their influence on the risk.  
2. Methods 
Blood-borne diseases can be transmitted through contact with bodily fluids, most often 
blood; they include Hepatitis B (HBV), Hepatitis C (HCV) and Human Immunodeficiency 
Virus (HIV). A probabilistic model was designed for the purpose of assessing the risk of 
these three viral infections due to re-use of syringes on multiple patients. The values for 
multiple risk factor variables used in this quantitative risk assessment were obtained from 
the literature (where data existed), consensus of opinions from a nationally commissioned 
expert working group, (Public Health Agency of Canada, 2008; Public Health Agency of 
Canada, 2009) and from information extracted from recently documented cases of syringe 
re-use in Canada and other countries. 
The risk assessment consisted of three main areas: 1) Issue identification, 2) Exposure and 
hazard assessment, and 3) Hazard and risk characterization. 
2.1 Issue identification 
There are many different types of IV apparatus systems, with possibly thousands of 
combinations of add-on auxiliary components. This assessment investigated the constituents 
of a basic IV administration apparatus, and the components of a generic disposable plastic 
syringe to choose a “most common method” used by health care workers to deliver 
medications to patients via the intravenous route. The apparatus chosen is described in the 
exposure and hazard assessment section below. 
2.2 Exposure and hazard assessment 
To provide preliminary estimates of the level of exposure to viral pathogens via plastic 
syringe re-use, assumptions in the following categories were defined:  
a. Assumptions of health care worker (HCW) practices 
The precise number of times an HCW will re-use a syringe is unknown, and 
independent of the number of times the syringe was re-used previously. 
b. Assumptions about medical device/instrument properties 
Contamination of the syringe/tubing via fluid backflow was estimated based on the 
proximity of the medication injection site to the patient. A generic instrument set up 
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was used, which consisted of an infusion bag, and a length of tubing long enough to 
have a significant fluid flow/possibility of wash-out between two sites of injection; one 
proximal injection site at the bag, one distal at the catheter. No filters, locks or check 
valves were taken into account.  
c. Assumptions on patient characteristics and needs 
Patients treated are randomly selected from a high risk population on which the syringe 
could have been re-used; virus carriers can potentially infect any of the subsequent 
patients in a group before a syringe is disposed; and the events of source patient 
infection, virus contamination of the syringe and transmitting virus to subsequent 
patients are independent.  
d. Assumptions on the nature of the viruses targeted 
In accordance with worst case scenario, the presence of virus in the blood of a model 
patient is binary (either yes or no); the infectivity of the virus is 100%. 
This assessment addresses only potential infection with re-used syringes. Other potential 
sources of contamination, in particular the contamination of multi-dose medicine vials, are 
not considered due to the lack of sufficient information in the literature.  
2.3 Hazard and risk characterization 
The model used probabilistic designed to assess the risk of HIV, HCV and HBV infection 
attributed to syringe re-use on multiple patients. The risk of viral contamination and 
subsequent patient infection only arises if the syringe is re-used. It is also changing with the 
number of syringe re-uses (ܵ), or equivalently with the number of previous infectious 
patients on whom the syringe was re-used	ሺܴଵ, ܴଶ, ܴଷ, … ሻ. The risk is lowered, but not 
completely eliminated, by a log reduction factor, if the syringe is flushed (this is known as 
“wash-out”). 
If ݏ patients were known to have been exposed to a re-used syringe, the risk of viral infection 
for the ݇th patient in the sequence of ݏ patients could be determined. The risk that the patient 
number ݇ will contract the viral infection from one of the previous ݇ െ ͳ patients is given by: 
ܴ௞ ൌ ܲሺ௦௨௦ሻ ൈ ቎ͳ െෑቀͳ െ ܲݎ݁ݒ ൈ ܲሺ௖௢௡௧ሻ ൈ ௞ܲି௝ሺ௧௥௔௡௦ሻቁ௞ିଵ௝ୀଵ ቏ , for ݇ ൌ ʹ,… , ݏ (1)
with	ܴଵ ൌ Ͳ, where ܲݎ݁ݒ is the prevalence, 	ܲሺ௖௢௡௧ሻ is the probability of contaminating the 
syringe, 	ܲሺ௖௢௡௧ሻ is the probability of being susceptible and ௞ܲି௝ሺ௧௥௔௡௦ሻ is the probability of 
transmitting the disease after ݇ െ ݆ െ ͳ usages. The individual risk (ܴ݅ݏ݇), or the risk 
imposed on a patient that underwent syringe re-use practice, is given by: 
ܴ݅ݏ݇ ൌ ܲሺ݌ݎܽܿݐ݅ܿ݁ሻ ൈ෍ͳݏ෍ܴ௞௦௞ୀଵ ൈ ܲሺܵ ൌ ݏሻஶ௦ୀଶ  (2)
Here, ܵ can be denoted as the number of injections until syringe replacement. The random 
variable ܵ follows a geometric distribution with mean number of re-uses ܯ given that ܵ	 ൒	ʹ. Thus, the individual risk is given by: 
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ܴ݅ݏ݇ ൌ ܲሺ݌ݎܽܿݐ݅ܿ݁ሻ ൈ ͳܯ െ ͳ ൈ෍ͳݏ෍ܴ௞௦௞ୀଵ ൈ ൬ͳ െ ͳܯ െ ͳ൰௦ିଶஶ௦ୀଶ  (3)
where ܲሺ݌ݎܽܿݐ݅ܿ݁ሻ is the probability of syringe re-use practice. While the derivation of the 
three equations is straightforward, proofs are given in Appendix 1 for completion. Table 1 
describes the model components and the values used to run the analysis.  
 
Component Variable Range or Description 
Probability 
Distribution* 
Syringe re-use practice ܲሺ݌ݎܽܿݐ݅ܿ݁ሻ 2.2% - 60%  Pert (2.2%, 20%, 60%)  
Wash-out factor ݎ ൌ ͳͲ௩  Log-reduction Uniform (1,2) 
HBV immunity ܲݎ݋
immu
 47%1 Triangular (46%, 47%, 
48%) 
HBV immunized but 
infected 
ܲݎ݋
immu and infected
 4%† Triangular (3.5%, 4%, 
4.5%) 
# of patients in one group ܵ Geometrically distributed Discrete Triangular (2, 
6,10) 
Mean # of patients in one 
group 
ܯ 2-10  
Prevalence  
HIV 
HCV 
HBV 
ܲݎ݁ݒ  
0.1% - 1.5% 
2% - 4% 
0.5% - 4% 
 
Pert (0.1%, 0.4%, 1.5%) 
Pert (0.5%, 2%, 4%) 
Pert (0.5%, 1%, 3%) 
Transmission  
HIV 
HCV 
HBV 
ௗܲሺ௧௥௔௡௦ሻ  
(0.3% - 0.5%) ൈ (wash-out 
factor)2 
(1% - 3%) ൈ (wash-out factor) 
(10% - 30%) ൈ (wash-out 
factor) 
 
Triangular (0.3%, 0.4%, 
0.5%) 
Triangular (1%, 2%, 3%) 
Triangular (10%, 20%, 
30%) 
Susceptibility  
HIV 
HCV 
HBV 
ܲሺ௦௨௦ሻ  ͳ െ ܲݎ݁ݒ ͳ െ ܲݎ݁ݒ	 ͳ െ ሺܲݎ݁ݒ ൅ ܲݎ݋
immuെ ܲݎ݋
immu and infected
ሻ 
 
 
Contamination  
Proximal 
Distal 
ܲሺ௖௢௡௧ሻ  
3.3% 
0.3% 
Triangular (2.3%, 3.3%, 
4.3%) 
Triangular (0.2%, 0.3%, 
0.4%) 
* Pert (min, most likely, max), Triangular (min, most likely, max) and Uniform (min, max) 
Table 1. Model components with the values and distributions used for the MCS analysis 
Monte Carlo Simulations (MCS) were necessary to incorporate uncertainties surrounding 
syringe re-use practice. MCS sometimes requires specific computational software and 
platforms. In this study, we have used Monte Carlo Simulations implemented on the R 
statistical software (R Development Core Team, 2010). 
                                                                 
1 Refer to Table 2. 
2 The efficiency of transmission is calculated by multiplying transmission percentage by log reduction 
(wash-out) factors. 
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The parameter “ܲݎ݋
immu
” represents the percentage of individuals who display HBV immunity 
after having received HBV vaccination. The immunogenicity of the HBV vaccine is not 100%, 
and requires multiple dosing to achieve protective antibody levels (≥ 10 IU/L) (Mackie et al., 
2009). The primary determinant of seroprotection is the age at which an individual is 
vaccinated. The average HBV seroprotection rates as described by the Canadian Immunization 
Guide (Public Health Agency of Canada, 2006) are outlined in Table 2.  
 
Age Range (years) Seroprotection Rates 
>2 95% 
5-15 99% 
20-29 95% 
30-39 90% 
40-49 86% 
50-59 71% 
≥ 60 50% to 70% 
Table 2. Seroprotection rates based on age groups following HBV vaccination, data from The 
Canadian Immunization Guide (Public Health Agency of Canada, 2006) 
Recipient factors other than age also affect the rate of seroprotection in vaccinated individuals. 
For example, the antibody response is lower in patients with diabetes mellitus (range: 70% to 
80%), renal failure (range: 60% to 70%) and chronic liver disease (range: 60% to 70%). Based on 
these factors, as well as vaccination uptake in the population, the expert group working on this 
assessment concluded that approximately 47% (range: 46% to 48%) of the general population 
is susceptible to HBV infection due to the absence of protective levels of antibodies to HBV in 
the year 2008 (Mackie et al., 2009; Public Health Agency of Canada, 2006).  
The parameter “ܲݎ݋
immu and infected
” represents the percentage of individuals who are HBV 
infected, and who have also been vaccinated against HBV, as of the year 2008. The value 
was determined through expert consensus of a nationally organized working group (Public 
Health Agency of Canada, 2008). 
Finally, a set of input distributions needed to be created for each variable, in order to run the 
MCS analysis. Using information provided by health care experts (Public Health Agency of 
Canada, 2009), we arrived at a set of distributions to address the uncertainty involved in 
syringe re-use (Table 1).  
3. Results 
Scenario analysis was conducted for each blood-borne viral infection using different input 
values and distributions (Table 1). For the three blood-borne viral infections, the model was 
most sensitive to changes in disease prevalence. For example, changing the prevalence of 
HIV from 0.004 to 0.015 increased the individual risk by about 4 times (0.161 and 0.596, 
respectively) for a value of average syringe re-use of 4 and a wash-out factor of 100. 
Similarly for HBV, increasing the prevalence from 0.005 to 0.030 increased the individual 
risk from 6.911 to 43.60, when using an average value of syringe re-use of 4 and a wash-out 
factor of 100. The increase in risk is almost linear in the disease prevalence, which is 
supported by the sensitivity analysis (Appendix 2).  
www.intechopen.com
 
The Continuum of Health Risk Assessments 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Probability density function of individual risk of viral infection (y-axis) for HIV, 
HCV, and HBV per million person-procedures (x-axis) for the proximal setting scenario. 
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Fig. 2. Probability density function of individual risk of viral infection (y-axis) for HIV, 
HCV, and HBV per million person-procedures (x-axis) for the distal setting scenario. 
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Analysis of the resultant probability density functions (refer to Figures 1 and 2) of the 
individual risk per million person-procedure indicates that the distribution is right-skewed 
for the three infections for both proximal and distal injection into IV lines. The dispersion is 
relatively close in both settings for each viral infection. However, the median risk (used for 
skewness concerns) in the distal setting is about 10% of that resulted for the proximal setting 
similar to what was found in a study by Perceval (1980). This indicates that individual risk 
of viral contamination is highly dependent on whether injection takes place at a site 
proximal or distal to the IV set. 
Table 3 and Table 4 present the individual risk per million people for proximal and distal 
medication injection sites. It is clear that the risk of HBV is highest in both settings due the 
higher efficacy of transmission inherent in the nature of the virus.  
 
Virus 95% CI Mean Median Coefficient of Variation 
HIV [0.0205, 0.3361] 0.1248927 0.1030704 0.6939076 
HCV [0.4584, 6.2700] 2.430697 2.090218 0.6436132 
HBV [1.7917, 21.8748] 8.292251 7.016490 0.6660043 
Table 3. Output of the uncertainty analysis- the mean, median and coefficient of variation 
for the individual risk per million person procedure for a medication injection site that is 
proximal to the patient’s IV set 
Virus 95% CI Mean Median Coefficient of Variation 
HIV [0.0017, 0.0313] 0.01138309 0.009550734 0.6966828 
HCV [0.0407,0.5597] 0.2197540 0.1911161 0.6202549 
HBV [0.1487, 2.0497] 0.7553183 0.6323613 0.6755055 
Table 4. Output of the uncertainty analysis- the mean, median and coefficient of variation 
for the individual risk per million person procedure for a medication injection site that is 
distal to the patient’s IV set 
A Monte Carlo Bayesian sensitivity analysis was performed, using the “tgp” package 
(Gramacy & Taddy, 2009) on the R statistical software (R Development Core Team, 2010). 
From a series of box plots (attached in Appendix 2) it is clear that prevalence, especially of 
HIV and HBV, should be considered in future analyses to identify the risk of patient 
infection with viral pathogens following syringe re-use. In the case of HIV, resolving the 
uncertainty surrounding prevalence alone would reduce the total variance by 45%, while it 
takes all other factors combined to contribute the same magnitude of effect. 
Additionally, it appears the main effect due to changes in the prevalence is linear (results 
not shown here but available upon request). The probability of (re-use) practice and the 
efficacies of transmission and contamination follow the prevalence in their influence and 
linear effect on the output. The remaining factors can be fixed to any value within their 
range without significantly impacting the output.  
4. Discussion 
The model estimated a broad range of infection risk for HIV, HCV, and HBV transmission 
through syringe re-use in the health care setting, as of the year 2008. The model estimated 
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the risk of contracting infection after syringe re-use to range from .02 - .34 in a million 
person-procedure for HIV; from .5 - 6.3 in a million person-procedure for HCV; and from 1.8 
- 21.8 in a million person-procedure for HBV. Moreover, vulnerable groups with reduced 
seroprotection and reduced immunity may experience more severe outcomes if exposed to 
blood-borne viruses by this route.  
In a similar study it was concluded that the risk of HBV on the Canadian population is 
highest in the proximal setting with risk of infection 12 - 53 per million followed by HCV (1 - 
4.3 per million) and HIV (.03 - .15 per million) (Sikora et al., 2010). The last two ranges are 
subsets of the ranges we give above while the probability of practice used in Sikora et al. 
(2010) is 20% - 80% which is higher than the range we used 2.2% - 60%. The risk of HBV is 
smaller in our results may be because the Population Health Branch-Saskatchewan Health 
study focused on the Albertan population when the authors estimated probability of 
susceptibility for HBV (Population Health Branch-Saskatchewan Health, 2009).  
The worst-case scenario risk assessment detailed here focuses on this event of syringe re-use 
as a way to quantify levels of risk for blood-borne viruses, to provide risk assessment 
information for better decision making, and to identify public health risk management 
lessons. Calculations were performed using the best available data at the time of this 
incident; the data used here are for the years 2008-2009. The authors acknowledge the fact 
that more and better data have become and will continue to become available. This risk 
assessment model allows for adaptation, further refinements, and future re-assessments 
based on improved input data. 
One of the more interesting and important outcomes of the modeling, is the identification of 
information gaps and sources of uncertainty in this kind of analysis. We identified a number 
of information gap areas that are amenable for improvement. First, there was substantial 
uncertainty surrounding the time period of events in this model. For example, the 
publication of guidelines in 1995 and 1996 must have had a time dependent effect on the 
practice of syringe re-use. Changes in syringe re-use practice over time were incorporated 
by using a wide range of probability, from a 2.2% chance of re-use to a 60% chance. As it is 
assumed that syringe re-use practice is decreasing, then the model may well have 
overestimated the probability of acquiring infection.  
Second, substantial uncertainty exists around the nature of the viruses targeted in this 
model context. Several aspects of the dose-response relationship and infectivity of the three 
viruses have been treated in a simplified manner to account for uncertainty around the 
potential concentration of the HBV/HCV/HIV within one exposure unit, the volumetric 
quantity to be considered a single exposure, and the values for viral survival. In addition, 
the simplification of the presence of virus to a binary (yes/no), does not take into account 
viral load which is an important factor. Regardless, these assumptions are necessary for 
generating a conservative risk estimate because all assumptions made will lead to an 
overestimated probability of acquiring infection. 
Third, estimates of the population level effect of infection acquisition were compromised by 
lack of data on the number of exposures. Infection control breaches may go unnoticed or 
unreported. In addition, estimates of the average number of exposures at the patient level 
are not available. 
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Fourth, reasons for syringe re-use by a HCW are seldom known - for example cost, time 
constraints, knowledge on the status of the patient (e.g., if the patient is known to be HIV or 
HCV positive, the HCW may avoid re-using the needle), and training may be contributing 
factors. Additionally, uncertainty surrounds the technique that the HCW uses to deliver the 
syringe content to the IV tubing; i.e., what factors determine a proximal vs. distal injection 
site, and does the HCW always verify line placement via blood return prior to administering 
the medication? 
In conclusion, syringes are not meant to be re-used in health care settings in order to protect 
patient safety and guidelines were established in both Canada (1997) and the US (1995) to 
prevent this type of exposure. It is important to stress this message, especially when 
guidelines are not followed. Using a systematic tool to facilitate assessment of risk is very 
helpful in this regard. Thus, when there is a breach in practice guidelines or an outbreak of 
disease due to syringe re-use, quantitative risk assessments can provide estimates to help 
guide the response of regulators, public health officials and clinicians.  
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6. Appendix 1: Proofs of equations 1, 2 and 3 
Proof of Equation 1 
Let us suppress the dependence on year ݐ for brevity in the following argument. Let ݇ be the 
order of the patient among the ݏ patients on which one syringe was used. If ݇ ൌ ͳ then there 
is null risk on him/her. For each ݇ ൌ ʹ,… , ݏ, if the patient is not susceptible, there is also null 
risk on him/her. This patient will not contract the viral infection from any of the previous ݇ െ ͳ patients if for each previous patient ݆, neither of the following happens:  
1. carrying the virus,  
2. transfer the virus to the syringe,  
3. transmission happens to a patient after k-j re-uses  
which has probability ቀͳ െ ܲݎ݁ݒ ൈ 	ܲሺ௖௢௡௧ሻ ൈ ௞ܲି௝ሺ௧௥௔௡௦ሻቁ. Thus given that patient ݇ is 
susceptible, by independence between the ݇ െ ͳ patients the probability that the patient will 
not contract the viral infection from any of the previous ݇ െ ͳ patients is ∏ ቀͳ െ ܲݎ݁ݒ ൈ௞ିଵ௝ୀଵ	ܲሺ௖௢௡௧ሻ ൈ ௞ܲି௝ሺ௧௥௔௡௦ሻቁ. Therefore, the probability of contracting the disease is  
ܴ௞ ൌ ܲሺ௦௨௦ሻ ൈ ቎ͳ െෑቀͳ െ ܲݎ݁ݒ ൈ 	ܲሺ௖௢௡௧ሻ ൈ ௞ܲି௝ሺ௧௥௔௡௦ሻቁ௞ିଵ௝ୀଵ ቏.	 
Proof of Equation 2 
Let us suppress the dependence on year t for brevity in the following argument. An 
individual chooses a national health care provider (HCP) that is practicing syringe re-use 
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(SR) with a probability ܲሺ݌ݎܽܿݐ݅ܿ݁ሻ. If the selected HCP is practicing SR, then that individual 
can be uniformly any one of the group of ܵ patients (ܵ here is random since there is no 
guarantee of a specific system of SR) on which one syringe was re-used. So his/her 
probability of being any one of the group is 
ଵௌ. Therefore, given that ݇ is his/her order in the 
group, the probability of contracting a viral infection from any one of the previous ݇ െ ͳ 
patients in the group is ܴ௞.  
Using the Total Probability Rule, the probability of acquiring the viral infection is given by  ܲሺacquiring	viral	infection	|practice	done	on	S	patientsሻൌ ෍ܲሺacquiring	viral	infection	|the	patientᇱs	oreder	among	the	S	patients	is	kሻௌ௞ୀଵ  ൈ Pሺthe	patientᇱs	oreder	among	the	S	patients	is	k	ሻ ൌ ∑ ܴ௞ௌ௞ୀଵ ൈ ଵௌ. 
Let ܲሺܵ ൌ ݏሻ be the discrete probability distribution of the number of patients in one group. 
Using the Total Probability Rule one more time, the individual risk is given by  ܴ݅ݏ݇ ൌ ܲሺacquiring	viral	infection	|practiceሻ ൈ ܲሺ݌ݎܽܿݐ݅ܿ݁ሻ൅ ܲሺacquiring	viral	infection	|no	practiceሻ ൈ ൫ͳ െ ܲሺ݌ݎܽܿݐ݅ܿ݁ሻ൯. 
But ܲሺacquiring	viral	infection	|no	practiceሻ ൌ Ͳ. Hence,  ܴ݅ݏ݇ ൌ ܲሺacquiring	viral	infection	|practiceሻ ൈ ܲሺ݌ݎܽܿݐ݅ܿ݁ሻ 
and ܲሺacquiring	viral	infection	|practiceሻ ൌ ∑ ܲሺacquiring	viral	infection	|practice	done	on	S ൌஶ௦ୀଶsሻ ൈ ܲሺܵ ൌ ݏሻ= ∑ ଵ௦∑ ܴ௞௦௞ୀଵ ൈ ܲሺܵ ൌ ݏሻஶ௦ୀଶ . 
Therefore,  ܴ݅ݏ݇ ൌ ܲሺ݌ݎܽܿݐ݅ܿ݁ሻ ൈ ∑ ଵ௦∑ ܴ௞௦௞ୀଵ ൈ ܲሺܵ ൌ ݏሻஶ௦ୀଶ . 
Note that ݏ starts from 2 since to have an SR practice it should be done on at least 2 patients 
in the one group and theoretically it can be on infinite number of patients but practically the 
sum will be truncated due to numerical negligence of the terms added.  
Proof of Equation 3 
Assuming that the nurse makes the decision of disposing the syringe randomly and 
independently of previous re-uses, the probabilistic experiment underlying the process is a 
geometric experiment. Let us also assume that the probability of syringe disposal (݌) is 
independent of the number of elapsed re-uses and ܯ ൒ ʹ be the average number of re-uses 
done in a HCP which need not to be an integer. Therefore, conditional that the number of re-
uses of one syringe (or number patients in one group) ܵ is at least 2, since we assume a SR 
practice; the mean would be given as 
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ܯ ൌ෍ݏஶ௦ୀଶ ܲሺܵ ൌ ݏሻ ൌ෍ݏ ൈஶ௦ୀଶ ݌ ൈ ሺͳ െ ݌ሻ௦ିଶ 
which implies that ݌ ൌ ଵெିଵ. 
Thus, the discrete probability distribution of the number of patients in one group is given by 
ܲሺܵ ൌ ݏሻ ൌ ͳܯ െ ͳ ൈ ൬ͳ െ ͳܯ െ ͳ൰௦ିଶ 
and equation (3) follows.  
7. Appendix 2: Sensitivity analysis 
The results of sensitivity analyses of the model output of the risk of HIV infection for several 
input variables for the proximal setting are shown in figure SI-1. This figure indicates that 
the model was most sensitive to uncertainty in the prevalence, followed by syringe re-use 
practice.  
 
Fig. SI-1. First order sensitivity indices and total effects sensitivity indices for HIV infection 
risk in proximal setting scenario. Legend: X1 prevalence, X4 transmission, X5 contamination, 
X6 syringe re-use practice, and X7 the mean number of syringe re-use, and X8 log reduction.  
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Figure SI-2 shows the results of sensitivity analyses of the model output of the risk of HCV 
infection for several input variables for the proximal setting scenario. The figure shows the 
model was most sensitive to risk of transmission (X4), followed by the practice of syringe re-
use (X6). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. SI-2. First order sensitivity indices and total effects sensitivity indices for HCV infection 
risk in the proximal setting scenario. Legend: X1 prevalence, X4 transmission, X5 
contamination, X6 syringe re-use practice, and X7 the mean number of syringe re-use, and 
X8 log reduction.  
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Figure SI-3 shows the first order sensitivity indices and total effects sensitivity indices for 
HBV infection risk in the proximal setting scenario. The individual risk was sensitive to 
prevalence (X1), transmission (X4), and practice of syringe re-use (X6). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. SI-3. First order sensitivity indices and total effects sensitivity indices for HBV infection 
risk in the proximal setting scenario. Legend: X1 prevalence, X2 immunized, X3 immunized 
but infected, X4 transmission, X5 contamination, X6 practice, X7 mean number of re-use, X8 
log reduction. 
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Figure SI-4 shows the results of sensitivity analyses of the model output of the risk of HIV 
infection for several input variables for the distal setting (a scenario in which the syringe is 
re-used to inject drug in a site distal to the patient’s IV set). As for the proximal setting, the 
model was sensitive for the prevalence (X1) and the practice of syringe re-use (X6).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. SI-4. First order sensitivity indices and total effects sensitivity indices for HIV infection 
risk in the distal setting scenario. Legend: X1 prevalence, X4 transmission, X5 contamination, 
X6 syringe re-use practice, and X7 the mean number of syringe re-use, and X8 log reduction.  
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Figure SI-5 shows the results of sensitivity analysis of the model output of the risk of HCV 
infection for several input variables for distal settings. The figure shows the model was most 
sensitive to uncertainty in the transmission (X4), followed the practice of syringe re-use (X6). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. SI-5. First order sensitivity indices and total effects sensitivity indices for HCV infection 
risk in the distal setting scenario. Legend: X1 prevalence, X4 transmission, X5 contamination, 
X6 syringe re-use practice, and X7 the mean number of syringe re-use, and X8 log reduction.  
www.intechopen.com
 
Risk of Syringe Re-Use in Canada 19 
Figure SI-6 shows the first order sensitivity indices and total effects sensitivity indices for 
HBV infection risk in the distal setting scenario. As for the proximal setting, the total effect 
was sensitive for prevalence (X1), transmission (X4), and practice of syringe re-use (X6). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. SI-6. The first order sensitivity indices and total effects sensitivity indices for HBV 
infection risk in the distal setting scenario. Legend: X1 prevalence, X2 immunized, X3 
immunized but infected, X4 transmission, X5 contamination, X6 practice, X7 mean number 
of re-use, X8 log reduction. 
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